The fact that McConnell has the power he does is the result of the majority of Senate GOP members acting consistently with the party (partisanship) than the ideology of the base. The GOP, as a party, is weak - we know this because in 2016 the party did not get its ideal presidential pick in the party-led nominating convention (i.e., anyone but Trump). President Trump's ideology clearly moved core GOP members: Graham and RonJon moved rightward after 2017 and arguably the same is true for Mike Lee, Hawley (compared to his revealed preferences as state AG), and Blackburn (compared to her House tenure). And we see some evidence of core members exiting because their ideology is at odds with the base: Portman (OH), Blunt (MO), Alexander (TN). The Senate is fairly well-designed to reward the party (committees are party cartels and with earmarks, the appropriations chair has substantial control over awards to loyalists). The expectation is that the GOP will realign ideologically with its base.
Part of the problem is the lack of intellectual leadership. Conservative grassroots simultaneously criticize federal regulatory policy as protecting large corporate incumbents while supporting the power of multinational tech companies. There are competing ideologies: one must be pro-global corporations to be free market; but pro-competition and therefore pro-small business; and therefore, post hoc, constitutional interpretation should support economic liberty. But we don't have a Milton Friedman or a William F. Buckley or a Russell Kirk who can answer the key questions and maintain partisan consilience over ideological contestation: Is Google a feature of free markets or the modern interpretation of the commerce clause? Does the constitution require states to regulate business even if inefficient, subject to cronyism, and inconsistent with rules from other states? Does support for competition mean having a skepticism of all forms of bigness? Can economic populism be compatible with libertarianism? The sources of ideological friction are clear: "conservatives" intuitively reject pluralist theories of power and maintain a formal distinction between government and society on the basis of law. This is an uniquely Austrian position (Hayek, Kelsen, Schmitt). As such, conservatives do not accept that Google has regulatory power (or believe it to be illegitimate if it exists) and rather than accede to the notion that Congress delegates its power, strict legality is maintained. But did the "laissez-faire" motivation behind the federal administrative state (to cloture competing state regulations) and the reorganization of Congress into a permanent committee system seed the existence of contemporary political pluralism? If so, conservatives cannot be rationalists about federal politics.
The fact that McConnell has the power he does is the result of the majority of Senate GOP members acting consistently with the party (partisanship) than the ideology of the base. The GOP, as a party, is weak - we know this because in 2016 the party did not get its ideal presidential pick in the party-led nominating convention (i.e., anyone but Trump). President Trump's ideology clearly moved core GOP members: Graham and RonJon moved rightward after 2017 and arguably the same is true for Mike Lee, Hawley (compared to his revealed preferences as state AG), and Blackburn (compared to her House tenure). And we see some evidence of core members exiting because their ideology is at odds with the base: Portman (OH), Blunt (MO), Alexander (TN). The Senate is fairly well-designed to reward the party (committees are party cartels and with earmarks, the appropriations chair has substantial control over awards to loyalists). The expectation is that the GOP will realign ideologically with its base.
Part of the problem is the lack of intellectual leadership. Conservative grassroots simultaneously criticize federal regulatory policy as protecting large corporate incumbents while supporting the power of multinational tech companies. There are competing ideologies: one must be pro-global corporations to be free market; but pro-competition and therefore pro-small business; and therefore, post hoc, constitutional interpretation should support economic liberty. But we don't have a Milton Friedman or a William F. Buckley or a Russell Kirk who can answer the key questions and maintain partisan consilience over ideological contestation: Is Google a feature of free markets or the modern interpretation of the commerce clause? Does the constitution require states to regulate business even if inefficient, subject to cronyism, and inconsistent with rules from other states? Does support for competition mean having a skepticism of all forms of bigness? Can economic populism be compatible with libertarianism? The sources of ideological friction are clear: "conservatives" intuitively reject pluralist theories of power and maintain a formal distinction between government and society on the basis of law. This is an uniquely Austrian position (Hayek, Kelsen, Schmitt). As such, conservatives do not accept that Google has regulatory power (or believe it to be illegitimate if it exists) and rather than accede to the notion that Congress delegates its power, strict legality is maintained. But did the "laissez-faire" motivation behind the federal administrative state (to cloture competing state regulations) and the reorganization of Congress into a permanent committee system seed the existence of contemporary political pluralism? If so, conservatives cannot be rationalists about federal politics.