The view you articulate shouldn't be controversial among those who believe in constitutional formalism and originalism. The bureaucratic, juridicial elites - risk-averse, pedigree- and position-oriented - were never held accountable for their lack of a material education. The letters of the American founders showed that their main concern motivating both independence from Britain and the unification of the colonies was the special dangers that resulted from "ministerial" governance. When the parliament uses its power to establish ministers who hold the power of a monarch but were dependent upon the parliament (versus the electorate) for such power, these ministers will have every incentive (including corruption) to ensure the election of parliament members who abdicate legislative responsibility through ministerial prerogative. Thus Sir Francis Bernard, 1st Baronet, and Thomas Hutchinson were both provincial governors who helped empower the British Board of Trade and the ministerial Lords of Trade (subsequently called "Commissioners") who were responsible for enforcing the Navigation Acts and asserted authority over all colonial trading. Thus the core objection of the Founders were parliamentary abdication through executive ministers who exercised legislative prerogative but were not subject to election. This is why so-called unitary executive partisans who seek control over ministerial offices (CFPB, FTC, SEC) are actually empowering congressional abdication and dilution of presidential power. The first sin was believing that the commerce clause meant that Congress could regulate all national business versus the view that Congress could not regulate any interstate business (absence of "with") other than trade through navigable waters that crossed state lines (use of "among the several"). Why would you need a clause governing laws "among the several states" when the Supremacy Clause should permit federal business rules to preempt such resource use cartels? Because Article VI, says "laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Thus Congress, not the several states, sets rules regarding the use of interstate navigable waters for trade ("commerce") among the several states. No states can conspire against other states to monopolize a navigable water that crosses state borders because that water belongs to the United States. Such water is "among" the states in the sense that no state has a distinct power over the water (hence the absence of the word "between" or "with"). The second sin is believing that Congress's establishing ministers to regulate business within the United States means the creation of executive rather than legislative officers. As executive officers, SEC commissioners rely on Title 5 (APA, FOIA, Inspectors General) and congressional oversight to make presidential supervision and control a farce. But as legislative officers, the president can prevent such agencies from having any law enforcement prerogative, can refuse to appoint commissioners, and can view his law enforcement power as immune and separate from what are legislative committees as a matter of constitutional law. The idea of a president subject to appointing ministers who nevertheless are supervised and controlled by Congress is precisely what the Founders rebelled against.
The view you articulate shouldn't be controversial among those who believe in constitutional formalism and originalism. The bureaucratic, juridicial elites - risk-averse, pedigree- and position-oriented - were never held accountable for their lack of a material education. The letters of the American founders showed that their main concern motivating both independence from Britain and the unification of the colonies was the special dangers that resulted from "ministerial" governance. When the parliament uses its power to establish ministers who hold the power of a monarch but were dependent upon the parliament (versus the electorate) for such power, these ministers will have every incentive (including corruption) to ensure the election of parliament members who abdicate legislative responsibility through ministerial prerogative. Thus Sir Francis Bernard, 1st Baronet, and Thomas Hutchinson were both provincial governors who helped empower the British Board of Trade and the ministerial Lords of Trade (subsequently called "Commissioners") who were responsible for enforcing the Navigation Acts and asserted authority over all colonial trading. Thus the core objection of the Founders were parliamentary abdication through executive ministers who exercised legislative prerogative but were not subject to election. This is why so-called unitary executive partisans who seek control over ministerial offices (CFPB, FTC, SEC) are actually empowering congressional abdication and dilution of presidential power. The first sin was believing that the commerce clause meant that Congress could regulate all national business versus the view that Congress could not regulate any interstate business (absence of "with") other than trade through navigable waters that crossed state lines (use of "among the several"). Why would you need a clause governing laws "among the several states" when the Supremacy Clause should permit federal business rules to preempt such resource use cartels? Because Article VI, says "laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Thus Congress, not the several states, sets rules regarding the use of interstate navigable waters for trade ("commerce") among the several states. No states can conspire against other states to monopolize a navigable water that crosses state borders because that water belongs to the United States. Such water is "among" the states in the sense that no state has a distinct power over the water (hence the absence of the word "between" or "with"). The second sin is believing that Congress's establishing ministers to regulate business within the United States means the creation of executive rather than legislative officers. As executive officers, SEC commissioners rely on Title 5 (APA, FOIA, Inspectors General) and congressional oversight to make presidential supervision and control a farce. But as legislative officers, the president can prevent such agencies from having any law enforcement prerogative, can refuse to appoint commissioners, and can view his law enforcement power as immune and separate from what are legislative committees as a matter of constitutional law. The idea of a president subject to appointing ministers who nevertheless are supervised and controlled by Congress is precisely what the Founders rebelled against.